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Summary
One goal of experimental economics is to provide data
to identify models that best describe the behavior of
experimental subjects and, more generally, human
economic behavior. We discuss here what we think
are the three main steps required to make experimen-
tal investigations of economic games as statistically
informative as possible: finding the solution of the ex-
perimental game under the postulated equilibrium or
other economic models, selecting from a potential
class of experimental designs the optimal one for dis-
criminating between those models, and choosing an
optimal stopping rule that indicates when to stop sam-
pling data and accept one model as the best explana-
tion of the data. Each step can be computationally in-
tensive. We offer an algorithmic presentation of the
necessary computations in each of the three steps and
illustrate these procedures by examples from our re-
search on learning models in experimental games with
incomplete information. These three steps of experi-
mental design and analysis are not limited to experi-
mental games, but the computational burden of imple-
menting these algorithms in other experimental envi-
ronments&mdash;for example, market experiments&mdash;requires
further considerations with which we have not dealt.
Introduction
We shall take as primitives a class of theoretical hypoth-
eses regarding the behavior of experimental subjects
and a class of economic environments in which those
hypotheses are to be tested. Our primary goal is to op-
timally design experimental studies to discriminate be-
tween the primitive collection of hypotheses and ana-
lyze the data produced by those experiments. There are
a variety of reasons for optimizing the experimental
design. The most obvious is that experiments are costly.
Moreover, some experimental designs may discrimi-
nate between models so poorly as to render them use-
less, even if the budget constraints on experimental
funds were not binding. We recognize three distinct
steps for proceeding from the primitive class of possible
experiments and class of rival theoretical models for
predicting choice behavior in each of the possible ex-
perimental environments, to selecting an optimal ex-
perimental design.
The first step is to derive the statistical predictions
of each of the rival hypotheses in each of the potential
experimental designs. This involves computing for each
model and experimental design a likelihood function
that assigns to each possible data point which we can
observe under our design the probability that that data
point was generated by this particular model. This is
typically not a simple exercise. Since simple economic
models with perfectly rational agents often make pre-
dictions that are too sharp, the use of those models can
lead to the zero likelihood problem: It is possible that we
observe data that all of our models predict could never
happen (e.g., subjects choosing strictly dominated ac-
tions). Ad hoc procedures such as discarding the zero-
likelihood data points defy the likelihood principle and
are incompatible with the application of the statistical
approach to design optimization and data analysis that
it requires. We therefore must adapt all of the models
so that they assign positive probability (likelihood) to all
possible data points. In our recent work (e.g., Boylan
and El-Gamal, 1993; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992; El-
Gamal, McKelvey, and Palfrey, 1993a; El-Gamal and
Palfrey, 1993), we have avoided the zero-likelihood
problem by introducing an error structure which posits
that subjects occasionally make errors. This seemingly
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&dquo;We shall take as primitives a class
of theoretical hypotheses regarding
the behavior of experimental sub-
jects and a class of economic envi-
ronments in which those hypotheses
are to be tested Our primary goal is
to optimally design experimental
studies to discriminate between the
collection of hypotheses and ana-
lyze the data produced by those ex-
periments. &dquo;
minor change in the models typically creates a major
computational challenge. In the absence of errors of
this type, the models can usually be solved in closed
form if the environments are simple enough. However,
with error, in even the simplest environments, calculat-
ing the predictions of the competing models turns out
to be a more difficult problem, which requires us to
search for numerical solutions. We present below a gen-
eral algorithm for numerically finding the predictions
of a given model. We illustrate our algorithm to calcu-
late a Nash equilibrium to the centipede game with a
particular error structure introduced in El-Gamal,
McKelvey, and Palfrey (1993b) and discuss the numer-
ical techniques we used to find that equilibrium.
The next step that is required once we obtain the
likelihood functions under each model, for each poten-
tial experimental design, is to find the optimal design-
within the class under consideration-for discriminat-
ing between those models. This optimal design selection
problem involves considering all possible data sets that
can be observed, calculating likelihood ratios for each of
the models under each of those data sets, and calculat-
ing the Kullback-Liebler information numbers for each
design. We can then select the design that is most in-
formative. The error structure of these models requires
the introduction of several nuisance parameters under
each model; hence the calculation of those information
numbers has to be performed under given priors on
those nuisance parameters. This can also be a rather
challenging numerical problem, which we discuss be-
low. We also provide a general algorithm for finding
the most informative experimental design given our
priors on the models and their nuisance parameters.
We illustrate that algorithm with an application to the
game of Vertigo introduced in El-Gamal and Palfrey
(1993). We find the optimal design under uninforma-
tive priors on the nuisance parameters, then reoptimize
the design after one experimental session, using the
updated beliefs on the nuisance parameters.
The last set of calculations that we need to make
deals with the analysis of the data as they are being
collected. As we collect data from our chosen design, we
update our beliefs about the various models and their
nuisance parameters. Given a loss function for the rel-
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ative cost of running more experiments versus possibly
choosing the wrong model, we can arrive at an approx-
imately optimal sequential probability ratio test (SPRT)
that tells us whether we should stop sampling and ac-
cept one of the rival models. We provide below a gen-
eral algorithm for this optimal sequential sampling and
design problem. We illustrate the optimal sequential
sampling by an application in El-Gamal, McKelvey, and
Palfrey (1993a).
Solving for Fixed Points
Among the most common tools for finding solutions to
economic problems are the fixed point theorems. For
instance, the solution of a stochastic dynamic program
(S, X, Q r, j3) with state space S, compact action space X,
weakly continuous state transition Q, continuous and
bounded reward function r, and a discount factor f3 E
(0,1), is obtained by solving for the value function:
The existence of such a value function uses the fact that
the operator T, defined by
satisfies monotonicity and discounting, and hence is a
contraction mapping (Blackwell, 1965). Since T is a con-
traction mapping, if we start with any initial guess Vo,
and iterate Vn + i = TV,,, we are guaranteed that V,, -j
V, the unique fixed point of the T. Implementing this
iterative algorithm for finding the fixed point by eval-
uating the functions Vr¡(s) at a finite number of grid
points is a common technique for solving problems of
this class.
In game theory with incomplete information, the
solution concept of a symmetric (Bayes) Nash equilib-
rium is also a fixed point concept. For a game of incom-
plete information with n players, action space A (the
same for all players), and payoffs c;(aj, ... , all) to
player i, a strategy is simply a function o&dquo; A ~ 91(A)
(where A is the space of beliefs on the relevant param-
eters of the game, and P(A) is the space of probability
measures on A). In the extensive form, the strategy will
be a mapping for each stage s of the game Q,,: A x H.S -~
91(A,), where HS is the history up to stage s, and A, is the
action space for stage s. As the two representations can
equally serve our purpose, we shall concentrate on the
normal form of the game. Given n - players are
using a vector of strategies 6’, and assuming that the
beliefs of the n players {~ 1, ... , À,J are drawn from a
common knowledge distribution ~L, the best response of
the nth player is defined by
A symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium u is a strategy that
is the best response to itself. In other words, if we let the
n - 1 players use the same strategy 0&dquo;, then u E agR(A,
6, ... , u). Finding a Bayes Nash equilibrium is, there-
fore, a fixed point problem. Unfortunately, unlike the
case of discounted dynamic programming, the best re-
sponse operator usually does not have the nice property
of being a contraction mapping. We therefore need an
algorithm to find the fixed point that does not impose
such structure on the mapping.
The solution lies in recognizing that our fixed point
problem can be converted into a minimization problem.
Let us consider an arbitrary fixed point problem: For a
given operator T: 3F ~ ~, find/such that Tf = f. Note
that by constructing the functional Qf) = mMfE-=g IITI
- III, the function Qif) ;:?: 0, and Qf) = 0 if and only
if f is a fixed point of T. In the two applications that we
have mentioned, the function f could be viewed as a
vector in Rd. In the dynamic programming example,
this interpretation corresponds to the value function
being evaluated at a finite number (d) of grid points. In
our games with incomplete information example, it cor-
responds to A being finite (with d actions available to
each of the players); hence a strategy at a given z is
simply a vector of probabilities (p 1, ... , pd) E [0, 1]d. In
either case, the problem is one of finding a fixed point
of some operator T~ on ~‘~ and can be converted into a
problem of minimizing the multidimensional function
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This minimization problem can be numerically solved
using any one of many standard multivariate minimi-
zation routines.
ALGORITHM FOR FINDING EQUILIBRIUM
In the particular example of finding a symmetric Bayes
Nash equilibrium for a game with incomplete informa-
tion, we can use the extra structure provided by the
game to simplify the minimization problem even fur-
ther. For instance, assume that there is a given belief X
which is a common knowledge belief (i.e., all players
have the same belief, they know that everyone else
knows that they all have the same belief, they know that
everyone knows that ...). Then, a strategy for that
fixed X is simply a vector (pl, Pd) E [0, 1]d. We can
now construct the function:
where
is the value to the nth player of using strategy ~’ when
all other players are using strategy p. It is straightfor-
ward (see McKelvey, 1990) to show that the function Q
is nonnegative and differentiable, with Q(p) = 0 if and
only if p is a symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium. For
each belief X, action space A = ai, ... , a~, and payoffs
Tr(.), this suggests the following simple algorithm for
finding the symmetric Bayes Nash equilibria:
ILLUSTRATION: CENTIPEDE GAME
We illustrate the algorithm discussed in the previous
section with the solution of a centipede game with irra-
tional agents from El-Gamal, McKelvey, and Palfrey
(1993b). Our game has four players: two of them are
labeled red players, and two are labeled blue. Each
player plays (in sequence) two stages of the game in
Figure 1, each stage being played with each of the two
players of the other color. In each stage game, the red
player begins with an opportunity to take $4 and leave
the blue player $1, or pass. If the red player passes, then
the blue player can take $8 and leave the red player $2,
or he can pass. If the blue player passes, then the red
player has another turn, and can take $16 and leave the
blue player $4, or can pass again. If the red player
passes at this last move of the stage game, then the blue
player gets $32, and the red player gets $8, and this
stage game is over.
If all players were perfectly rational, then all four
stage games would end in the red players taking on the
first round. If perfect rationality is not assumed, the
problem becomes much more complicated (e.g., see
Binmore, 1989; Reny, 1993; Rosenthal, 1982; Au-
mann, 1988; Kreps et al., 1982). We propose a partic-
ular type of irrationality: namely, that an irrational
player always flips a fair coin to choose whether he
should pass or take at each of his decision nodes. We
assume that there is a true proportion q of irrationals in
the population, each agent has a belief L/[0,8J on q,
and believes that everyone else’s belief on q is identical
to his. To symmetrize the game, and hence be able to
look for a symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium, we as-
sume that nature randomly chooses the players’ colors
with equal probability, and irrationality independently
with probability q. Thus, a rational player has to decide
on a strategy if red and a strategy if blue. A strategy for
red consists of one probability (mixed strategy) for tak-
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ing in the first move of the stage game, and four prob-
abilities for taking in the first move of the second stage
game, one for each of the four possible histories in the
first stage game: red takes (T), red passes then blue
takes (PT), red passes then blue passes then red takes
(PPT), or red passes then blue passes then red passes
(PPP). A rational red player will always take in the last
move of either stage game, so those strategies are sup-
pressed. Similarly, the strategy for blue consists of one
probability for taking in the first stage game and four
probabilities for taking in the second stage game, de-
pending on whether the first stage game ended in T,
PT, PPT, or PPP. The full symmetric Bayes Nash equi-
librium of this game as modeled, therefore, is 10 prob-
abilities (5 for red, 5 for blue) for each value of the
belief 8 E [0, 1 ], and the equilibrium fixed point can be
obtained by using the algorithm in the previous section
to minimize:
We refer to the resulting equilibrium as the Se-
quential-Nash (SN) equilibrium. The alternative equi-
librium model we used is one where the agents play
each of the two stage games ignoring the fact that they
play the other. In that second model, labeled the Myo-
pic Nash (MN), players do not update about q between
the two games; the minimization problem for finding
the equilibrium of the MN model is two-dimensional
(probability of red passing and probability of blue
passing).
For the calculation of the equilibria depicted in Fig-
ures 2 through 7, we implemented the above algorithm
at each of 30 grid points on 8 E [0, 1] and used the
Powell’s method routine in Press et al. (1988) to bring
Q(p; 8) to less than 10 - 20 at each of those grid points.
The rest of the program was written in C and compiled
and vectorized on a CRAY X-MP/18. We needed ap-
proximately 40 CPU hours to achieve the final solutions
reported here. In our experience with this problem, the
function Q(.; 8) was not very well behaved, in the sense
of having many narrow valleys far away from the zero
(minimum) of the function. This suggests that non-
greedy algorithms, such as simulated annealing, will be
Fig. 1 One stage of the
three-move centipede
game
Fig. 2 Prob. red passes
first game, SN
Fig. 3 Prob. blue passes
first game, SN
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Fig. 4 Prob. red passes
each game, MN
Pig. 5 Prob. blue passes
each game, MN
Fig. 6 Prob. red passes
second game, SN
poorly suited for locating the fixed point strategies
(equilibria) for similar problems.
Optimal Experimental Design
In the previous section, we discussed the general nu-
merical methodology of finding equilibria to experi-
mental games under models that allow all observable
data samples to occur with positive probability. Now,
given the class of models in question, the equilibria un-
der these models give us likelihood functions for ob-
servable data from a variety of experimental designs. In
the experimental design stage, we can invoke statistical
notions of optimal design to discriminate between the
given class of models. To make our discussion concrete,
let us assume that we have a class of experiments pa-
rameterized by some parameter vector a. Typically, out
will correspond to payoff structures, probability distri-
butions on payoff relevant state spaces, etc. Then,
the optimal experimental design problem is the prob-
lem of finding the optimal value of a to use in our
experiments.
Let X be the space of all possible data sets under all
of our designs. Denote a typical data set by x. Let the
likelihoods of a given data set x E X under design out for
each of our n competing models be 1, (x; a), ... ,1&dquo;(x; a).
Given a collection of priors on models 1, ... , n, say pl,
... , Pn’ we can define for each model the Kullback-
Liebler information number measuring how informa-
tive a given design is expected to be if that model were
correct. For example, the information number for
model 1 under design a is simply
The design that maximizes our expected separation be-
tween model 1 and the other n - 1 models, if model 1
were indeed the correct model, is aT = arg max(,,IA 7(1;
a). If we want to maximize the overall informativeness
of our design, we weight our information numbers by
our prior on each of the models and choose a~‘ -
maX«zA 12= 1 p¡I (i; a).
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ALGORITHM FOR OPTIMIZING THE DESIGN
Starting with a family of likelihood functions 11, ... , l,t
corresponding to our n models, priors p I.... 1 P,, on the
n models, and a family A of designs, we need to calcu-
late the information number for each of the models
, I
finding the optimal design aT = maxCiEA I(i; a) for each
of our models, and the overall optimal design a* de-
fined in the previous subsection. The following algo-
rithm accomplishes this.
ILLUSTRATION: VERTIGO
Obviously, for complicated games, the procedure out-
lined above would be computationally infeasible. In or-
der to implement our optimal experimental design al-
gorithm of the previous subsection, it must be relatively
easy to calculate the likelihood functions 1,,(x; a) for all
designs parameterized by a E A. We therefore chose a
class of games that are parameterized by a small num-
ber of parameters and whose equilibria are easy to find
for each of the rival models. For that purpose, we in-
troduced the game of Vertigo in El-Gamal and Palfrey
(1993). Vertigo is a game of one-sided incomplete in-
formation. The stage game is defined by the following
pair of possible games, labeled Game I and Game II:
Game I, drawn with probability Tr
Game II, drawn with probability 1 - if
The entries in each box are the payoffs to row
player and column player, respectively, corresponding
to a particular strategy profile. The players know the
values of 1T and that Game I is drawn with probability 1T.
The row players observe whether Game I or Game II
was drawn, but the column players do not. Each of the
component games has a unique mixed strategy equilib-
rium, and the only relevant payoff statistic for all play-
ers is b = a¡/(a¡ + a2). The general class of designs was
fixed, with c and b left as design parameters over which
we can optimize. In the notation of the previous sub-
section, a = (r, b). The game is played in five stages and
10 rounds. In the beginning of each round, a game
(Game I or Game II) is drawn with the announced
probability 1r and is used for the five stages of that
round. All the row players are informed of the draw for
that round. In each of the stages, the row and column
players move simultaneously, and they are informed of
their opponent’s move, but the column players are not
informed of their payoffs (and hence cannot directly
infer which game was drawn). For each stage, each col-
umn player is matched with a row player he has not
played before, and the row player he is currently
matched with is informed of the history of moves by the
other row players who have played his current match.
This allows the row player to infer the current belief
(about which game was drawn) of the column player
with whom he is matched. After all five stage games
have been played, the payoff table is revealed to the
column players, and they calculate their payoffs. The
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Fig. 7 Prob. blue passes
second game, SN
Fig. 8 Optimal design
with priors Eo - U[0,11, K
- U[0,0.31
entire procedure is then repeated for later rounds, with
a new game being drawn.
In El-Gamal and Palfrey (1993), we had six models
of behavior corresponding to varying degrees of sophis-
tication in updating and strategic behavior of the sub-
jects. We shall concentrate here on two of those models
to illustrate the issues of optimal experimental design.
In both these models, we assume that there is a proba-
bility Et with which each of the players in each of the
stage games in round t can become confused and
choose an action by flipping a fair coin. We assume that
there is learning by doing, which causes the probability
of confusion to decline over time, so we model et =
Eoe - &dquo;r. The values of Eo and K are assumed to be com-
mon knowledge for the subjects, but unknown to us.
The two models we consider here differ in that one
allows the subjects to use Bayesian updating between
rounds to learn about the true game that is being
played, and the other does not. Of the six models in
El-Gamal and Palfrey (1993), these models are labeled
UF for unsophisticated with fast updating and UN for
unsophisticated with no updating. We impose priors on
the nuisance parameters (eo, K) by first deciding on the
supports being Eo E [0, 1] and K E [0, 0.3] (K = 0.3
corresponds to e jo = F-0/20), and then making our priors
uniform over those supports. Using those priors and
the equilibrium behavior under our two models, we can
construct the likelihood functions for all possible data
sets and compute the information numbers as discussed
earlier in this section. The optimal design for distin-
guishing between our two models was found to be 1T =
1/6 and b = 0.2. The contours of the information sur-
face as a function of (,7T, b) between the two given models
are shown in Figure 8.
After running an experimental session with 16 sub-
jects, the posterior odds ratio between those two models
was still very close to 1, but our posteriors on Eo and K
had changed considerably, concentrating most of the
mass near Eo = 0.7 and K = 0.1. When we recomputed
the information surface with those new parameters, the
optimal design turned out to be 1T = 0.2 and b = 0.4.
The contours of the information surface with the pos-
teriors on Eo and K are shown in Figure 9. We used that
second design in an experimental session with 10 sub-
 at CALIFORNIA INST OF TECHNOLOGY on April 5, 2016hpc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
jects, and the result was a posterior odds between the
two models of the order 10~ in favor of the model with
no updating. In fact, we found the unsophisticated
model with no updating to be the best of all six models
we analyzed in El-Gamal and Palfrey (1993), signifi-
cantly outperforming all the sophisticated and unso-
phisticated models in explaining the behavior of our
experimental subjects. Note that despite the fact that
the first design did not help us distinguish between the
two models, its by-product updating of our priors on
the nuisance parameters allowed us to recalculate the
information numbers, and the reoptimized design gave
us the very sharp results that we were seeking. The
most computationally intensive part of our analysis was
the calculation of the information numbers over a grid
of 50 points on 1r and 50 points on b. Each of the design
surfaces whose contours are shown in Figures 8 and 9
required approximately 2 CPU hours to complete on a
CRAY Y-MPI2EJ116.
Optimal Sequential Sampling
One problem faced when collecting experimental data
is how to decide when to stop sampling. One simple
decision rule we can use is to allocate a fixed budget for
a particular series of experiments and stop sampling
when the budget is exhausted. This decision rule, how-
ever, is not based on any optimality principles. For ex-
ample, it is conceivable that early data could be so de-
cisive in discriminating between the rival models that
the rest of the budget can be saved for other projects. It
is also conceivable that after collecting some data, our
beliefs about the nuisance parameters of the various
models change in such a way that we know that a par-
ticular experimental design will not be useful in dis-
criminating between the models of interest. We have
already seen the latter effect in the illustration in the
previous section, where the ex ante optimal design
turned out to be quite uninformative once our beliefs
on the nuisance parameters were updated. In this sec-
tion, we wish to disentangle the issues of optimal design
and redesign from the issue of finding an optimal stop-
ping rule. Therefore, in the remainder of this section,
we assume that we have a given design with which we
sample until we decide to stop and accept one of the
rival models. For simplicity, we shall, for the remainder
of the section, consider the case with only two rival mod-
els.
The stopping rule we chose belongs to the family of
Wald’s sequential probability ratio tests (SPRTs). If we
induce a 0-K loss function (the loss of selecting the cor-
rect model is 0, the cost of selecting the wrong model is
I~, the SPRT has the remarkable property of minimiz-
ing the expected sample size (and hence the expected
cost of the set of experiments) in the class of all tests
with the same type I and type II error probabilities (e.g.,
see Chernoff, 1972, chapters 11,12, and Berger, 1985,
chapter 7). SPRTs take the form: continue sampling
until the likelihood ratio between the two models
crosses one of two boundaries. If the upper boundary is
crossed, accept the model whose likelihood appears in
the numerator of the likelihood ratio, and if the lower
boundary is the one crossed, accept the other model. A
number of approximations to compute the optimal
stopping boundaries have been proposed. The most
popular approximations involve using Wald’s approxi-
mation of probabilities of type I and type II error and
the expected stopping time (Chernoff, 1972, pp. 59-
66 ; Berger, 1985, pp. 485-499). Berger (1985, p. 500)
suggests a further approximation based on the cost per
experiment c being much smaller than the loss of se-
lecting the wrong model K. The resulting rule sets the
boundaries A = - crr/(I(2)K( 1 - 1r)), and B = 1rR7(1)/
(c( 1 - 1r)), where iT is the prior on model 1 being cor-
rect, I(t) is the information number for model i calcu-
lated in the same manner as the algorithm in the pre-
vious section prescribes, and we stop and accept model
1 if the likelihood ratio of model 1 to model 2 is greater
than B, stop and accept model 2 if the likelihood ratio is
less than A, and continue sampling otherwise.
ALGORITHM FOR OPTIMAL
SEQUENTIAL SAMPLING
In this section, we consider two rival models and a given
experimental design, and the only issue is whether we
should run another experiment or not. The following
algorithm outlines the main steps of calculating the
stopping boundaries of the SPRT discussed above. It is
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Fig. 9 Optimal design
with posteriors on &euro;(, ==
0.7, K ^ 0.1
Fig. 10 Time series of
10 loglo of odds ratio
(solid line) and stopping
boundaries (dashed
lines)
easy to see how we can implement more sophisticated
versions of this algorithm which take into consideration
the possibility of sequentially optimizing and reoptimiz-
ing the design.
ILLUSTRATION: CENTIPEDE GAME
In El-Gamal, McKelvey, and Palfrey (1993a), we imple-
mented the SPRT described above for analyzing a
slightly more complicated model of the centipede game
presented above. In that model, we assumed that there
was a fixed proportion q of altruists in the population.
Altruists always pass when given the chance. Each agent
i was modeled as having a belief about q which is U[0, 8;]
and was assumed to believe that all other agents had the
same bi. The true distribution of the 87’s was assumed to
be U[0, y], and y is unknown to us. We also assumed
that with probability e, each of the players at each of the
nodes could get confused and decide whether to pass or
take by flipping a fair coin. The probability e was as-
sumed to be common knowledge for the players, but
unknown to us. For each pair of parameters e and 8, we
can solve for the symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium of
the game following the algorithm for finding equilib-
rium given above. We called the model in which all the
players use the strategies defining that symmetric Bayes
Nash equilibrium the Sequential Nash model. The rival
model we posited is the one of McKelvey and Palfrey
(1992), in which the symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium
is found for the one-stage game and is assumed to be
the same for all stages (i.e., that players do not update
their beliefs about q between games and do not take into
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consideration the possibility of such updating in con-
structing their strategies), and we called that the Non-
sequential Nash model.
For the SPRT between the Sequential and Nonse-
quential Nash models described above, we chose the
values K = I and c = 0.01, and started with the un-
biased prior odds Tr 1/2 in favor of the SN model (an
initial odds ratio of 1 ). Using those parameters in the
above-described algorithm yields stopping boundaries
A = 0.238 and B = 4.5. After sampling 19 matches
(each consisting of four players as described above), we
stopped and chose the Sequential Nash model. The dy-
namics of our posterior odds ratio is shown in Figure
10. To make the plot more symmetric, we plot 10 times
logarithm of base 10 of‘ the posterior odds ratio and
stopping boundaries. The vertical lines correspond to
experimental sessions, and the gray lines indicate that
the first three sessions were inherited from an earlier
design. We had started with the model of rationality
discussed above but found that the given design, to-
gether with those models, was uninformative. We
therefore switched to the model of rationality described
in this section, reanalyzed the old data, and continued
sampling until we accepted one of the two models. For
more details on the decision to change our models of
irrationality, see El-Gamal, McKelvey, and Palfrey
(1993b). The most computationally intensive part of
this study was finding the equilibria for a grid of 30
points on 8 and 20 points on E, under the new model of
irrationality, which took approximately 20 CPU hours
on a CRAY Y-MP/2E-116. To find the equilibria under
the new model of irrationality, we first initialized the
search for the equilibrium with E = 0.05 at the equilib-
rium under the old model of rationality. For each
higher E, we initialized the search at the equilibrium for
the next lowest E on the grid. The calculation of the
information numbers for this model was not very com-
putationally intensive because our design allowed for
only 256 possible data sets.
Concluding Remarks
We have defined what we view as the three most im-
portant computational aspects in designing and analyz-
ing experimental studies of games: finding the likeli-
hood functions under each of a class of rival models,
finding the optimal experimental design for discrimi-
nating between those models, and finding the optimal
rule for stopping and accepting one of the models. We
discussed each of the three issues in a general context
that makes our discussion, and the algorithms we pro-
pose, applicable to a very wide class of studies (not nec-
essarily limited to experimental games or to experimen-
tal studies in general). We then illustrated the feasibility
and usefulness of implementing those algorithms with
applications in our research on learning in experimen-
tal games. We hope that as the computational restric-
tions continue to be relaxed, the issues of optimal sta-
tistical design and analysis will be more seriously con-
sidered in future experimental economic research.
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